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ABSTRACT
We propose a general framework for the design of securi-
ties markets over combinatorial or innite state or outcome
spaces. The framework enables the design of computation-
ally ecient markets tailored to an arbitrary, yet relatively
small, space of securities with bounded payo. We prove
that any market satisfying a set of intuitive conditions must
price securities via a convex cost function, which is con-
structed via conjugate duality. Rather than deal with an
exponentially large or innite outcome space directly, our
framework only requires optimization over a convex hull.
By reducing the problem of automated market making to
convex optimization, where many ecient algorithms exist,
we arrive at a range of new polynomial-time pricing mecha-
nisms for various problems. We demonstrate the advantages
of this framework with the design of some particular mar-
kets. We also show that by relaxing the convex hull we can
gain computational tractability without compromising the
market institution's bounded budget.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics; G.1.6
[Numerical Analysis]: Optimization
General Terms
Algorithms, Economics, Theory
1. INTRODUCTION
Securities markets play a fundamental role in economics
and nance. A securities market oers a set of contingent
securities whose payos depend on the future state of the
world. For example, an Arrow-Debreu security pays $1 if
a particular state of the world is reached and $0 other-
wise [3, 4]. Consider an Arrow-Debreu security that will pay
o in the event that a category 4 or higher hurricane passes
through Florida in 2011. A Florida resident who worries
about his home being damaged might buy this security as
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a form of insurance to hedge his risk; if there is a hurricane
powerful enough to damage his home, he will be compen-
sated. Additionally, a risk-neutral trader who has reason to
believe that the probability of a category 4 or higher hur-
ricane landing in Florida in 2011 is p should be willing to
buy this security at any price below p or (short) sell it at
any price above p to capitalize his information. For this rea-
son, the market price of the security can be viewed as the
traders' collective estimate of how likely it is that a power-
ful hurricane will occur. Securities markets thus have dual
functions: risk allocation and information aggregation
Insurance contracts, options, futures, and many other -
nancial derivatives are examples of contingent securities. A
securities market primarily focused on information aggrega-
tion is often referred to as a prediction market. The forecasts
of prediction markets have proved to be accurate in a variety
of domains [5, 24, 32]. While our work builds on ideas from
prediction market design [2, 10, 28], our framework can be
applied to any contingent securities.
A securities market is said to be complete if it oers jOj 1
independent securities over a set O of mutually exclusive
and exhaustive states of the world, which we refer to as out-
comes [3, 4, 25]. For example, a prediction market with
n Arrow-Debreu securities for n outcomes is complete. In a
complete securities market without transaction fees, a trader
may bet on any combination of the securities, allowing him
to hedge any possible risk he may have. It is generally as-
sumed that the trader may short sell a contract, betting
against the given outcome; in a market with short selling,
the nth security is not strictly necessary, as a trader can
substitute the purchase of this contract by short selling all
others. Furthermore, traders can change the market prices
to reect any valid probability distribution over the outcome
space, allowing them to reveal any belief. Completeness
therefore provides expressiveness for both risk allocation and
information aggregation.
Unfortunately, completeness is not always achievable. In
many real-world settings, the outcome space is exponentially
large or even innite. For instance, a competition among n
candidates results in an outcome space of n! rank orders,
while the future price of a stock has an innite outcome
space, namely R+. In such situations operating a complete
securities market is not practical for two reasons: (a) hu-
mans are notoriously bad at estimating small probabilities
and (b) it is computationally intractable to manage such
a large set of contracts. Instead, it is natural to oer a
smaller set of structured securities. For example, rather
than oer a security corresponding to each rank ordering,in pair betting a market maker oers securities of the form
\$1 if candidate A beats candidate B" [11]. There has been
a surge of recent research examining the tractability of run-
ning standard prediction market mechanisms (such as the
popular Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule (LMSR) market
maker [20]) over combinatorial outcome spaces by limiting
the space of available securities [29]. While this line of re-
search has led to a few positive results [1, 13, 14, 19], it has
led more often to hardness results [12, 14] or to markets with
undesirable properties such as unbounded loss of the market
institution [16].
In this paper, we propose a general framework to design
automated market makers for securities markets. An auto-
mated market maker is a market institution that adaptively
sets prices for each security and is always willing to accept
trades at these prices. Unlike previous research aimed at
nding a space of securities that can be eciently priced us-
ing an existing market maker like LMSR, we start with an
arbitrary space of securities and design a new market maker
tailored to this space. Our framework is therefore extremely
general and includes both the LMSR and Quad-SCPM [2]
market makers.
We take an axiomatic approach. Given a relatively small
space of securities with bounded payo, we dene a set of
intuitive conditions that a reasonable market maker should
satisfy. We prove that a market maker satisfying these con-
ditions must price securities via a convex potential function
(the cost function), and that the space of reachable security
prices must be precisely the convex hull of the payo vectors
for each outcome (that is, the set of vectors, one per out-
come, denoting the payo for each security if that outcome
occurs). We then incorporate ideas from online convex opti-
mization [22, 31] to dene a convex cost function in terms of
an optimization over this convex hull; the vector of prices is
chosen as the optimizer of this convex objective. With this
framework, instead of dealing with the exponentially large or
innite outcome space, we only need to deal with the lower-
dimensional convex hull. The problem of automated market
making is reduced to the problem of convex optimization,
for which we have many ecient techniques to leverage.
To demonstrate the advantages of our framework, we pro-
vide two new computationally ecient markets. The rst
market can eciently price subset bets on permutations,
which are known to be #P-hard to price using LMSR [12].
The second market can be used to price bets on the landing
location of an object on a sphere.
Finally, for situations where the convex hull cannot be ef-
ciently represented, we show that we can relax the convex
hull to gain computational tractability without compromis-
ing the market maker's bounded budget. This allows us
to provide a computationally ecient market maker for the
aforementioned pair betting, which is also known to be #P-
hard to price using LMSR [12]. In addition, this relaxation
could potentially allow the market maker to charge transac-
tion fees so that the depth of the market can be dynamically
increased as the number of trades increases. This desirable
property is discussed in Othman et al. [28] who proposed a
corresponding market that extends the LMSR; utilizing our
techniques for this purpose is left for future work.
This paper builds upon intuitions from earlier work [10]
exploring the striking mathematical connections between
complete, cost function based prediction markets and no-
regret learning and online convex optimization. In this pa-
per, we pursue a general convex optimization framework for
pricing an arbitrary set of securities over a potentially very
large outcome space. Agrawal et al. [2] and Peters et al. [30]
also use convex optimization for automated market making.
In addition to only considering complete markets, they for-
mulate the convex optimization quite dierently { their for-
mulation is for limit orders and does not explicitly make the
connection with conjugate duality as our framework does.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the rst work on
designing markets that are tailored to the incomplete secu-
rity spaces without explicitly reasoning over a large outcome
space.
2. PRELIMINARIES
A simple cost function based market maker [9, 10, 20, 21]
oers jOj Arrow-Debreu securities, each corresponding to
a potential outcome. The market maker determines how
much each security should cost using a dierentiable cost
function, C : R
jOj ! R, which is simply a potential function
specifying the amount of money currently wagered in the
market as a function of the number of shares of each security
that have been purchased. If qo is the number of shares of
security o currently held by traders, and a trader would like
to purchase a bundle of ro shares for each security o 2 O
(where some ro could be zero or even negative, representing
a sale), the trader must pay C(q + r)   C(q) to the market
maker. The instantaneous price of security o (that is, the
price per share of an innitely small portion of a security)
is then @C(q)=@qo, and is denoted po(q).
The market designer is free to choose any dierentiable
cost function C that satises a few basic properties. First,
it must be the case that for every o 2 O and every q 2 R
jOj,
po(q)  0. This ensures that the price of a security is never
negative. Second, assuming short sells are allowed, if the
market designer wishes to prevent arbitrage, it must be the
case that for every q 2 R
jOj,
P
o2O po(q) = 1. That is, the
sum of the instantaneous prices of the securities must always
be 1. If the prices summed to something less than (respec-
tively, greater than) 1, then a trader could purchase (re-
spectively, sell) small equal quantities of each security for a
guaranteed prot.
1 These conditions ensure that the current
prices can always be viewed as a probability distribution over
the outcome space. One example of a cost function based
market that has received considerable attention is Hanson's
Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule (LMSR) [9, 20, 21]. The
cost function of the LMSR is C(q) = blog
P
o2O e
qo=b,
where b > 0 is a parameter of the market controlling the rate
at which prices change. The corresponding price function for
each security o is po(q) = @C(q)=@qo = e
qo=b=
P
o02O e
qo0=b.
When jOj is large or innite, calculating the cost of a pur-
chase becomes intractable in general. Recent research has
focused on restricting the allowable securities over a combi-
natorial outcome space and examining whether LMSR prices
can be computed eciently in the restricted space. If the
outcome space contains n! rank orders of n competing can-
didates, it is #P-hard to price pair bets (e.g., \$1 if and
only if candidate A beats candidate B") or subset bets (e.g.,
\$1 if one of the candidates in subset C nishes at position
1This no-arbitrage condition, while sometimes desirable, is
not necessary. Othman et al. [28] recently analyzed a vari-
ation of LMSR in which
P
o2O po(q)  1. We also explore
relaxations of the no-arbitrage condition in Section 5.k") using LMSR on the full set of permutations [12]. If the
outcome space contains 2
n Boolean values of n binary base
events, it is #P-hard to price securities on conjunctions of
any two base events (e.g., \$1 if and only if a Democrat
wins Florida and Ohio") using LMSR [12]. This line of re-
search has led to some positive results when the uncertain
event enforces particular structure on the outcome space. In
particular, for a single-elimination tournament of n teams,
securities such as\$1 if and only if team A wins a kth round
game" and \$1 if and only if team A beats team B given
they face o"can be priced eciently using LMSR [13]. For
a taxonomy tree on some statistic where the value of the
statistic of a parent node is the sum of those of its children,
securities such as \$1 if and only if the value of the statistic
at node A belongs to [x;y]" can be priced eciently using
LMSR [19].
The framework we will introduce next takes a drastically
dierent approach. Instead of searching for supportable
spaces of securities for existing market makers, we design
new market makers tailored to any security space of inter-
est. Additionally, rather than requiring that securities have
a xed $1 payo when the underlying event happens, we
allow more general contingent securities with arbitrary, e-
ciently computable and bounded payos.
3. A FRAMEWORK FOR MARKET-
MAKING FOR COMPLEX SECURITIES
In the complete cost function based markets described
above, the market maker oers an Arrow-Debreu security
corresponding to each potential outcome. We consider a
market-design scenario where the outcome space O could
potentially be quite large, or even innite, making it infea-
sible to run such a market. Instead, we allow the market
maker to oer a menu of K securities for some reasonably-
sized K, with the (nonnegative) payo of each security de-
scribed by an arbitrary but eciently-computable function
 : O ! R
K
+. Specically, if a trader purchases a share of
security i and the outcome is o, then the trader is paid i(o).
We call such security spaces complex. A complex security
space reduces to the complete security space if K = jOj and
for each i 2 f1; ;Kg, i(o) = 1 if o is the ith outcome
and 0 otherwise. We consider traders that purchase security
bundles r 2 R
K. Negative elements of r encode sales. The
payo for r upon outcome o is exactly (o)  r, where (o)
denotes the vector of payos for each security for outcome
o. Let (O) := f(o)jo 2 Og.
While it is easy to put intuitive constraints on market
prices to ensure that a complete market is \well-behaved",
determining the comparable constraints on market prices for
an arbitrary set of complex securities is challenging. In par-
ticular, while the no-arbitrage condition easily leads to the
restriction that the security prices in a complete market need
to sum to 1, it is much less clear what space of security prices
should be allowed in order to prevent arbitrage in markets
over complex securities. This is because the events under
which complex securities will pay out are no longer mutu-
ally exclusive. This challenge leads us to take an axiomatic
approach to understand what constraints a \well-behaved"
market maker for complex securities must satisfy.
We do not presuppose a cost function based market. How-
ever, in Section 3.1, we show that the use of a convex cost
function is necessary given the assumption of path indepen-
dence on the contract purchases. We then derive additional
constraints on the form of this cost function. In Sections 3.2{
3.4, we go on to show how to design an appropriate cost
function by employing techniques from online convex opti-
mization.
3.1 Imposing Some Natural Restrictions on
the Market Maker
In this section we introduce a sequence of conditions or
axioms that one might expect a market to satisfy, and show
that these conditions lead to some natural mathematical re-
strictions on the costs of security bundles. (We consider
relaxations of these conditions in Section 5.) Similar con-
ditions were suggested for complete markets by Chen and
Vaughan [10], who dened the notion of a valid cost func-
tion, and by Othman et al. [28], who discussed properties
similar to our notions of path independence and expressive-
ness, among others. However, no similar conditions have
been described for complex markets.
Imagine a sequence of traders entering the marketplace
and purchasing security bundles. Let r1;r2;r3;::: be the
sequence of security bundles purchased. After t   1 such
purchases, the tth trader should be able to enter the market-
place and query the market maker for the cost of arbitrary
bundles. The market maker must be able to furnish a cost
Cost(rjr1;:::;rt 1) for any bundle r given a previous trade
sequence r1;:::;rt 1. If the trader chooses to purchase rt
at a cost of Cost(rtjr1;:::;rt 1), the market maker may
update the costs of each bundle accordingly. Our rst con-
dition requires that the cost of acquiring a bundle r must be
the same regardless of how the trader splits up the purchase.
Condition 1 (Path Independence). For any r, r
0,
and r
00 such that r = r
0 + r
00, for any r1;:::;rt,
Cost(rjr1;:::;rt) = Cost(r
0jr1;:::;rt)+Cost(r
00jr1;:::;rt;r
0):
Path independence helps to reduce both arbitrage oppor-
tunities and the strategic play of traders, as they no longer
need to reason about the optimal path leading to some tar-
get position. However, it is worth pointing out that there are
interesting markets not satisfying this condition, for exam-
ple, the continuous double auction (CDA) and the market
maker for CDA considered by Das [15], which in our opinion
deserve separate treatment.
It turns out that the path independence alone implies that
prices can be represented by a cost function C, as illustrated
in the following theorem. The proof is by induction on t.
2
Theorem 1. Under Condition 1, there exists a cost func-
tion C : R
K ! R such that we may always write
Cost(rtjr1;:::;rt 1)
= C(r1 + ::: + rt 1 + rt)   C(r1 + ::: + rt 1):
With this in mind, we drop the cumbersome
Cost(rjr1;:::;rt) notation from now on, and write the cost
of a bundle r as C(q+r) C(q), where q = r1 +:::+rt is
the vector of previous purchases.
2An appendix containing omitted proofs is available in the
version of this paper posted on the authors' websites.Now, recall that one of the functions of a securities mar-
ket is to aggregate traders' beliefs into an accurate pre-
diction. Each trader may have his own (potentially se-
cret) information about the future, which we represent as
a distribution p 2 jOj over the outcome space, where
n = fx 2 R
n
0 :
Pn
i=1 xi = 1g, the n-simplex. The pric-
ing mechanism should therefore incentivize the traders to
reveal p, but simultaneously avoid providing arbitrage op-
portunities. Towards this goal, we introduce four additional
conditions on our pricing mechanism.
The rst condition ensures that the gradient of C is always
well-dened. If we imagine that a trader can buy or sell an
arbitrarily small bundle, we would like the cost of buying
and selling an innitesimally small quantity of any particular
bundle to be the same. If rC(q) is well-dened, it can
be interpreted as a vector of instantaneous prices for each
security, with @C(q)=@qi representing the price per share of
an innitesimally small amount of security i. Additionally,
we can interpret rC(q) as the traders' current estimates of
the expected payo of each security, in the same way that
@C(q)=@qo was interpreted as the probability of outcome o
when considering the complete security space.
Condition 2 (Existence of Instantaneous Prices).
C is continuous and dierentiable everywhere.
The next condition encompasses the idea that the market
should react to trades in a sensible way in order to incorpo-
rate the private information of the traders. In particular, it
says that the purchase of a security bundle r should never
cause the market to lower the price of r. It turns out that
this condition is closely related to incentive compatibility for
a myopic trader. It is equivalent to requiring that a trader
with a distribution p 2 jOj can never nd it simultaneously
protable (in expectation) to buy a bundle r or to buy the
bundle  r. In other words, there can not be more than one
way to express one's information.
Condition 3 (Information Incorporation). For
any q and r 2 R
K, C(q+2r) C(q+r)  C(q+r) C(q).
The no arbitrage condition states that it is never possible
for a trader to purchase a security bundle r and receive a
positive prot regardless of the outcome.
Condition 4 (No Arbitrage). For all q;r 2 R
K,
there exists an o 2 O such that C(q + r)   C(q)  r  (o).
Finally, the expressiveness condition species that any
trader can set the market prices to reect his beliefs about
the expected payos of each security if arbitrarily small por-
tions of shares may be purchased. Here  R denotes the ex-
tended real numbers, [ 1;1].
Condition 5 (Expressiveness). For any p 2 jOj,
9q 2  R
K for which rC(q) = Eop[(o)].
For any subset S of R
d, let H(S) denote the convex hull
of S. Recall that (O) := f(o)jo 2 Og. We characterize
the form of the cost function under these conditions.
Theorem 2. If H((O)) is closed,
3 then under Condi-
tions 2-5, C must be convex with frC(q) : q 2 R
Kg =
H((O)).
3The closure assumption is not strictly necessary, but is per-
fectly natural in typical settings. We include it for con-
venience. Without it, the conclusion can be modied to
frC(q) : q 2 R
Kg = closure(H((O))).
Proof. We rst prove convexity. Assume C is non-
convex somewhere. Then there must exist some q and r
such that C(q) > (1=2)C(q + r) + (1=2)C(q   r). This
means C(q + r)   C(q) < C(q)   C(q   r), which contra-
dicts Condition 3, so C must be convex.
Now, Condition 2 trivially guarantees that rC(q) is well-
dened for any q. To see that frC(q) : q 2 R
Kg 
H((O)), let us assume there exists some q
0 for which
rC(q
0) = 2 H((O)). This can be reformulated in the fol-
lowing way: There must exists some halfspace, dened by a
normal vector r, that separates rC(q
0) from every member
of (O). More precisely
rC(q
0) = 2 H((O)) () 9r8o 2 O : rC(q
0)r < (o)r;
where the strict inequality is because H((O)) is closed. On
the other hand, letting q := q
0 r, we see by convexity of C
that C(q+r) C(q)  rC(q
0)r. Combining these last two
inequalities, we see that the price of bundle r purchased with
history q is always smaller than the payo for any outcome.
This implies that there exists some arbitrage opportunity,
contradicting Condition 4.
Finally, since H((O) = fEop[(o)]jp 2 jOjg, Condi-
tion 5 implies that H((O))  frC(q) : q 2 R
Kg.
What we have arrived at from the set of proposed condi-
tions is that (a) the pricing mechanism is always described
precisely in terms of a convex cost function C and (b) the set
of reachable prices, that is the set frC(q) : q 2 R
Kg, must
be identically the convex hull of the payo vectors for each
outcome H((O)). For complete markets, those with a sin-
gle security corresponding to each of the n distinct outcomes,
this would imply that the set of reachable prices should be
the convex hull of the n standard basis vectors. Indeed, this
comports exactly with the natural assumption that the vec-
tor of security prices in complete markets should represent
a probability distribution, or equivalently that it should lie
in the n-simplex.
3.2 Designing the Cost Function via Conju-
gate Duality
The natural conditions we introduced above imply that
to design a market for a set of K securities with payos
specied by an arbitrary payo function  : O ! R
K
+, we
should use a cost function based market with a convex, dif-
ferentiable cost function such that frC(q) : q 2 R
Kg =
H((O)). We now provide a general technique that can be
used to design and compare properties of cost functions that
satisfy these criteria. In order to accomplish this, we make
use of tools from convex analysis.
It is well known
4 that any closed, convex, dierentiable
function C : R
K ! R can be written in the form C(q) =
supx2dom(R) x  q   R(x) for a strictly convex function R
called the conjugate of C, where dom(R) denotes the domain
of R. (The strict convexity of R follows from the dierentia-
bility of C.) Furthermore, any function that can be written
in this form is convex. As we will show in Section 3.3, the
gradient of C can be expressed in terms of this conjugate:
rC(q) = argmaxx2dom(R) xq R(x). To generate a convex
cost function C such that rC(q) 2  for all q for some set
4For a detailed discussion of convex conjugates and their
properties, refer to a good text on convex optimization
such as Boyd and Vandenberghe [6] or Hiriart-Urruty and
Lemar echal [23]., it is therefore sucient to choose an appropriate conju-
gate function R, restrict the domain of R to , and dene
C as
C(q) = sup
x2
x  q   R(x) : (1)
We call such a market a complex cost function based mar-
ket. To generate a cost function C satisfying our ve condi-
tions, we need only to set  = H((O)) and select a strictly
convex function R to serve as the conjugate.
This method of dening C is convenient for several rea-
sons. First, it leads to markets that are ecient to imple-
ment whenever  can be described by a polynomial number
of simple constraints. The diculty with combinatorial out-
come spaces is that actually enumerating the set of outcomes
can be challenging or impossible. In our proposed framework
we need only work with the convex hull of the payo vectors
for each outcome when represented by a low-dimensional
payo function (). This has signicant benets, as one
often encounters convex sets which contain exponentially
many vertices yet can be described by polynomially many
constraints. Moreover, as the construction of C is based
entirely on convex programming, we reduce the problem of
automated market making to the problem of optimization
for which we have a wealth of ecient algorithms. Similar
techniques have been applied to design learning algorithms
in the online convex optimization framework [22, 31], where
R plays the role of a regularizer, and have been shown to be
ecient in a variety of combinatorial applications, including
online shortest paths, online learning of perfect matchings,
and online cut set [8].
Second, this method yields simple formulas for properties
of markets that help us choose the best market to run. Two
of these properties, worst-case monetary loss and worst-case
information loss, are analyzed below.
Note that both the LMSR and Quad-SCPM [2] are exam-
ples of complex cost function based markets, though they
are designed for the complete market setting only.
3.3 BoundingMarketMakerLossandLossof
Information
Before discussing market properties, it is useful to review
some helpful properties of conjugates. The rst is a conve-
nient duality: For any convex, closed function C, the conju-
gate of the conjugate of C is C itself. This implies that if C
is dened as in Equation 1, we may write
R(x) = sup
q2RK
q  x   C(q):
Since this maximization is unconstrained, and we are assum-
ing that our cost function C is dierentiable, the maximum
occurs when rC(q) = x. (Note that this may hold for
many dierent values of q.) Suppose for a particular pair
(x
;q
) we have rC(q
) = x
. We can then rewrite this
equation as R(x
) = q
  x
   C(q
), which gives us that
C(q
) = q
x
 R(x
). From Equation 1, this tells us that
x
 must be a maximizer of x  q   R(x). In fact, it is the
unique maximizer due to strict convexity. This implies, as
mentioned above, that rC(q) = argmaxx2 x  q   R(x).
By a similar argument we have that for any q, if rR(x) =
q then x maximizes x  q   R(x) and therefore, as we have
just shown, x = rC(q). However, the fact that x = rC(q)
does not imply that rR(x) = q; in the markets we consider,
it is generally the case that x = rC(q) for multiple q.
We will make use of the notion of Bregman divergence.
The Bregman divergence with respect to a convex function
f is given by
Df(x;y) := f(x)   f(y)   rf(y)(x   y):
It is clear by convexity that Df(x;y)  0 for all x and y.
Additionally, we will require notions like the interior and
boundary of a convex set, yet we must introduce more care-
ful terminology in order to consider the case that our price
space is not of full rank. Given a convex set S  R
d that
occupies d
0-dimensional linear subspace, where potentially
d
0 < d, we dene the relative interior of S, relint(S), which
is the interior of S when restricted to the d
0-dimensional
space (typically known as the ane hull of S). In addition,
we dene the relative boundary of S, relbnd(S), as the set
closure(S) n relint(S).
With these tools in hand, we are ready to examine some
market properties, and see how they depend on R.
3.3.1 Bounding the Market Maker’s Monetary Loss
When comparing market mechanisms, it is useful to con-
sider the market maker's worst-case monetary loss,
sup
q2RK

sup
o2O
((o)  q)   C(q) + C(0)

:
This quantity is simply the worst-case dierence between
the maximum amount that the market maker might have to
pay the traders (supo2O (o)  q) and the amount of money
collected by the market maker (C(q)   C(0)). The follow-
ing theorem provides a bound on this loss in terms of the
conjugate function.
Theorem 3. Consider any complex cost function based
market with  = H((O)). The worst-case monetary loss
of the market maker is no more than
sup
x2(O)
R(x)   inf
x2H((O))
R(x);
and when o is such that (o) = argmaxx2H((o)) R(x) then
this loss is realized in the limit for q as rC(q) ! (o).
This theorem tells us that as long as the conjugate func-
tion is bounded on H((O)), the market maker's worst-case
loss is also bounded
5. It says further that this loss is actually
realized, for a particular outcome o, at least when the price
vector approaches o. This suggests that loss to the market
maker is worst when the traders are the most certain about
the outcome.
3.3.2 Bounding Information Loss
Information loss can occur when securities are sold in
discrete quantities (for example, single units), as they are
in most real-world markets. Without the ability to pur-
chase arbitrarily small bundles, traders may not be able
to change the market prices to reect their true beliefs
about the expected payo of each security, even if expres-
siveness is satised. We will argue that the amount of in-
formation loss is captured by the market's bid-ask spread
5In Section 5, we will state a more general, stronger bound
on market maker loss capturing the intuitive notion that the
market maker's prots should be higher when the distance
between the nal vector of prices and the payo vector (o)
of the true outcome o is large; see Theorem 6.for the smallest trading unit. Given some q, the cur-
rent bid-ask spread of security bundle r is dened to be
(C(q + r)   C(q))   (C(q)   C(q   r)). This is simply the
dierence between the current cost of buying the bundle r
and the current price at which r could be sold.
To see how the bid-ask spread relates to information loss,
suppose that the current vector of quantities sold is q. If se-
curities must be sold in unit chunks, a rational, risk-neutral
trader will not buy security i unless she believes the expected
payo of this security is at least C(q + ei)   C(q), where
ei is the vector that has value 1 at its ith element and 0
everywhere else. Similarly, she will not sell security i unless
she believes the expected payo is at most C(q) C(q ei).
If her estimate of the expected payo of the security is be-
tween these two values, she has no incentive to buy or sell
the security. In this case, it is only possible to infer that the
trader believes the true expected payo lies somewhere in
the range [C(q) C(q ei);C(q+ei) C(q)]. The bid-ask
spread is precisely the size of this range.
The bid-ask spread depends on how fast instantaneous
prices change as securities are bought or sold. Intuitively,
the bid-ask spread relates to the depth of the market. When
the bid-ask spread is large, new purchases or sales can
change the prices of the securities dramatically; essentially,
the market is shallow. When the bid-ask spread is small,
purchases or sales may only move the prices slightly; the
market is deep. Based on this intuition, for complete mar-
kets, Chen and Pennock [9] use the inverse of @
2C(q)=@q
2

to capture the notion of market depth for each security i
independently. In a similar spirit, we dene a market depth
parameter, , for our complex securities markets with twice-
dierentiable C. Larger values of  correspond to deeper
markets. We will bound the bid-ask spread in terms of this
parameter, and use this parameter to show that there ex-
ists a clear tradeo between worst-case monetary loss and
information loss; this will be formalized in Theorem 4 below.
Definition 1. For any complex cost function based mar-
ket, if C is twice-dierentiable, the market depth parameter
(q) for a quantity vector q is dened as (q) = 1=Vc(q),
where Vc(q) is the largest eigenvalue of r
2C(q), the Hessian
of C at q. The worst-case market depth is  = infq2RK (q).
Let relint() be the relative interior of . If C is twice-
dierentiable, then for any q such that rC(q) 2 relint(),
we have a correspondence between the Hessian of C at q
and the Hessian of R at rC(q). More precisely, we have
that u
>r
2C(q)u = u
>r
 2R(rC(q))u for any u = x   x
0
with x;x
0 2 . (See, for example, Gorni [17] for more.)
This means that (q) is equivalently dened as the smallest
eigenvalue of r
2R(rC(q))j; that is, where we consider the
second derivative only within the price region .
The denition of worst-case market depth implies that
1= is an upper bound on the curvature of C, which implies
that C is locally bounded by a quadratic with Hessian I=.
We can derive the following.
Lemma 1. Consider a complex cost function based mar-
ket with worst-case market depth . For any q and r we
have
DC(q + r;q) 
krk
2
2
:
It is easy to verify that the bid-ask spread can be written
in terms of Bregman divergences. In particular, C(q + r)  
C(q)   (C(q)   C(q   r)) = DC(q + r;q) + DC(q   r;q).
This implies that the worst-case bid-ask spread of a mar-
ket with market depth  can be upperbounded by a con-
stant times 1=. That is, as the market depth parameter
increases, the bid-ask spread must decrease. The following
theorem shows that this leads to an inherent tension be-
tween worst-case monetary loss and information loss. Here
diam(H((O))) denotes the diameter of the hull of the pay-
o vectors for each outcome.
Theorem 4. For any complex cost function based mar-
ket with worst-case market depth , for any r, q meeting
the conditions in Lemma 1, the bid-ask spread for bundle
r with previous purchases q is no more than krk
2=. The
worst-case monetary loss of the market maker is at least
  diam
2(H((O)))=8.
We can see that there is a direct tradeo between the up-
per bound
6 of the bid-ask spread, which shrinks as  grows,
and the lower bound of the worst-case loss of the market
maker, which grows linearly in . This tradeo is very in-
tuitive. When the market is shallow (small ), small trades
have a large impact on market prices, and traders cannot
purchase too many shares of the same security without pay-
ing a lot. When the market is deep (large ), prices change
slowly, allowing the market maker to gain more precise in-
formation, but simultaneously forcing the market maker to
take on more risk since many shares of a security can be pur-
chased at prices that are potentially too low. This tradeo
can be adjusted by scaling R, which scales . This is analo-
gous to adjusting the \liquidity parameter" b of the LMSR.
3.4 Selecting a Conjugate Function
We have seen that the choice of the conjugate function
R impacts market properties such as worst-case loss and
information loss. We now explore this choice in more detail.
In many situations, the ideal choice of the conjugate is a
function of the form
R(x) :=

2
kx   x0k
2: (2)
Here R(x) is simply the squared Euclidean distance between
x and an initial price vector x0 2 , scaled by =2. By uti-
lizing this quadratic conjugate function, we achieve a mar-
ket depth that is uniformly  over the entire security space.
Furthermore, if x0 is chosen as the \center" of , namely
x0 = argminx2 maxy2 kx yk, then the worst-case loss of
the market maker is maxx2 R(x) = (=8)diam
2(). While
the market maker can tune  appropriately according to the
desired tradeo between worst-case market depth and worst-
case loss, the tradeo is tightest when R has a Hessian that is
uniformly a scaled identity matrix, or more precisely where
R takes the form in Equation 2.
Unfortunately, by selecting a conjugate of this form, or
any R with bounded derivative, the market maker does in-
herit one potentially undesirable property: security prices
6Strictly speaking, as we are emphasizing the necessary
tradeo between bid-ask spread and worst-case loss, we
should have a lower bound on the bid-ask spread. On the
other hand, if the worst-case market depth parameter is 
then there is some q and r such that DC(q + r;q)=krk
2 
1=(2) and this approximation can be made arbitrarily tight
for small enough r when C is twice dierentiable.may become constant when rC(q) reaches a point at
relbnd(), the relative boundary of  (see Section 3.3).
That is, if we arrive at a total demand q where rC(q) =
(o) for some outcome o, our mechanism begins oering se-
curities at a price equal to the best-case payo, akin to asking
someone to bet a dollar for the chance to possibly win a dol-
lar. The Quad-SCPM for complete markets is known to
exhibit this behavior [2].
To avoid these undesirable pricing scenarios, it is sucient
to require that our conjugate function satisfy one condition.
We say that a convex function R dened on  is a pseudo-
barrier
7 for  if krR(xt)k ! 1 for any sequence of points
x1;x2;::: 2  which tends towards relbnd(). If we re-
quire our conjugate function R to be a pseudo-barrier, we
are guaranteed that the instantaneous price vector rC(q)
always lies in relint(), and does not become constant near
the boundary.
It is important to note that, while it is desirable that
krR(xt)k ! 1 as xt approaches relbnd(), it is gener-
ally not desirable that R(xt) ! 1. Recall that the market
maker's worst-case loss grows with the maximum value of
R on  and thus we should hope for a conjugate function
that is bounded on the domain. A perfect example of con-
vex function that is simultaneously bounded and a pseudo-
barrier is the negative entropy function H(x) =
P
i xi logxi,
dened on the n-simplex n. It is perhaps no surprise that
LMSR, the most common market mechanism for complete
security spaces, can be described by the choice R(x) :=
H(x) where the price space  = n [2, 10].
4. EXAMPLES OF COMPUTATIONALLY
EFFICIENT MARKETS
In the previous section, we provided a general framework
for designing markets on combinatorial or innite outcome
spaces. We now provide some examples of markets that can
be operated eciently using this framework.
4.1 Subset Betting
Consider the scenario in which the outcome is some rank-
ing of a set of n competitors, such as n horses in a race.
The outcome of such a race is a permutation  : [n] ! [n],
where (i) is the nal position of i, with (i) = 1 being
best, and [n] denotes the set f1; ;ng. A typical market
for this setting might oer n Arrow-Debreu securities, with
the ith security paying o if and only if (i) = 1. Addition-
ally, there might be separate, independent markets allowing
bets on horses to place (come in rst or second) or show
(come in rst, second, or third). However, running indepen-
dent markets for sets of outcomes with clear correlations is
wasteful in that information revealed in one market does not
automatically propagate to the others.
Chen et al. [11] proposed a betting language, subset betting
in which traders can place bets (i;j), for any candidate i and
any slot j, that pay out $1 in the event that (i) = j and $0
otherwise.
8 Chen et al. [12] showed that pricing bets of this
7We use the term pseudo-barrier to distinguish this from the
typical denition of a barrier function on a set , which is a
function that grows without bound towards the boundary of
. The term Legendre was introduced by Cesa-Bianchi and
Lugosi [7] for a similar notion, yet their denition requires
the stronger condition that  contain a nonempty interior.
8The original denition of subset betting allowed bets of
the form \any candidate in set S will end up in slot j" or
form using LMSR is #P-hard and provided an algorithm
for approximating the prices by exploiting the structure of
the market. Using our framework, it is simple to design a
computationally ecient market for securities of this form.
In order to set up such a combinatorial market within our
framework, we must be able to eciently work with the con-
vex hull of the payo vectors for each outcome. Notice that,
for an outcome , the associated payo can be described by
a matrix M, with M(i;j) = I[(i) = j], where I[] is the
indicator function. Taking this one step further, it is easy
to verify that the convex hull of the set of permutation ma-
trices is precisely the set of doubly stochastic matrices, that
is the set
 =
8
<
:
X 2 R
nn
0 :
n X
i0=1
X(i
0;j) =
n X
j0=1
X(i;j
0) = 1 8i;j
9
=
;
;
where X(i;j) represents the element at the ith row and jth
column of the matrix X. Notice, importantly, that this set
is described by only n
2 variables and O(n) constraints.
To fully specify the market maker, we must also select
a conjugate function R for our price space. While the
quadratic conjugate function is an option, there is a natural
extension of the entropy function, whose desirable proper-
ties were discussed in the previous section, for the space of
stochastic matrices. For any X 2 , let us set
R(X) = 
X
i;j
X(i;j)logX(i;j):
The worst-case market depth is computed as the minimum
of the smallest eigenvalue of the Hessian of R within the
relint(). This occurs at the matrix with all values 1=n,
hence the worst-case depth is n. The worst-case loss, on
the other hand, is easily computed as nlogn.
4.2 Sphere Betting
We now consider an example in which the outcome space
is innite. An object orbiting the planet, perhaps a satel-
lite, is predicted to fall to earth in the near future and will
land at an unknown location, which we would like to predict.
We represent locations on the earth as unit vectors u 2 R
3.
The diculty of this example arises from the fact that the
outcome must be a unit vector, imposing constraints on the
three coordinates. We will design a market with three secu-
rities, each corresponding to one coordinate of the nal loca-
tion of the object. In particular, security i will pay o ui+1
dollars if the object lands in location u. (The addition of
1, while not strictly necessary, ensures that the payos, and
therefore prices, remain positive, though it will be necessary
for traders to sell securities to express certain beliefs.) This
means that traders can purchase security bundles r 2 R
3
and, when the object lands at a location u, receive a payo
(u + 1)  r. Note that in this example, the outcome space is
innite, but the security space is small.
The price space H((O)) for this market will be the 2-
norm unit ball centered at 1. To construct a market for this
scenario, let us make the simple choice of R(x) = kx 1k
2
for some parameter  > 0. When kqk  2, there exists
an x such that rR(x) = q. In particular, this is true for
x = (1=2)q= + 1, and q  x   R(x) is minimized at this
\candidate i will end up in one of the slots in set S." A
bet of this form can be constructed easily using our betting
language by bundling multiple securities.point. When kqk > 2, q  x   R(x) is minimized at an x
on the boundary of H((O)). Specically, it is minimized
at x = q=jjqjj + 1. From this, we can compute
C(q) =
(
1
4kqk
2 + q  1; when kqk  2;
kqk + q  1   ; when kqk > 2:
The market depth parameter  is 2; in fact, (x) = 2 for
any price vector x in the interior of H((O)). By Theorem 3,
the worst-case loss of the market maker is no more than ,
which is precisely the lower bound implied by Theorem 4.
Finally, the divergence DC(q + r;q)  krk
2=(4) for all
q;r, with equality when kqk;kq + rk  2, implying that
the bid-ask spread scales linearly with krk
2=.
5. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
AND RELAXATIONS
In Section 3, we argued that the space of feasible price
vectors should be precisely H((O)), the convex hull of the
payo vectors for each outcome. In each of our examples,
we have discussed market scenarios for which this hull has a
polynomial number of constraints, allowing us to eciently
set prices via convex optimization
9. Unfortunately, one
should not necessarily expect that a given payo function
and outcome space will lead to an eciently describable con-
vex hull. In this section, we explore a couple of approaches
to overcome such complexity challenges. First, we discuss
the case in which H((O)) has exponentially (or innitely)
many constraints yet gives rise to a separation oracle. Sec-
ond, we show that the price space  can indeed be relaxed
beyond H((O)) without increasing the risk to the market
maker. Finally, we show how this relaxation applies in prac-
tice.
5.1 Separation Oracles
If we encounter a convex hull H((O)) with exponentially-
many constraints, all may not be lost. Recall that, in order
to set prices, we need to solve the optimization problem
maxx2H((O)) qx R(x). Under certain circumstances this
can still be solved eciently.
Consider a convex optimization problem with a concave
objective function f(x) and constraints gi(x)  0 for all i in
some index set I. That is, we want to solve:
max f(x)
s.t. x 2 R
d
gi(x)  0 8i 2 I
This can be converted to a problem with a linear objective
in the standard way:
max c
s.t. x 2 R
d;c 2 R
f(x)  c
gi(x)  0 8i 2 I
Of course, if I is an exponentially or innitely large set we
will have trouble solving this problem directly. On the other
9A convex program can be solved with arbitrarily small error
 in time polynomial of 1= and the size of the problem
input using standard techniques such as the interior-point
method. In this paper, we do not worry about nding the
exact solution to the convex programs.
hand, the constraint set may admit an ecient separation
oracle, dened as a function that takes as input a point
(x;c) and returns true if all the necessary constraints are
satised or, otherwise, returns false and species a vio-
lated constraint
10. Given an ecient separation oracle one
has access to alternative methods for optimization, the most
famous being Khachiyan's ellipsoid method, that run in poly-
nomial time. For more details see, for example, Gr otschel et
al [18].
This suggests that a fruitful direction for designing compu-
tationally ecient market makers is to examine the pricing
problem on an instance-by-instance basis, and for a particu-
lar instance of interest, leverage the structure of the instance
to develop an ecient algorithm for solving the specic sep-
aration problem. We leave this for future research.
5.2 Relaxation of the Price Space
When dealing with a convex hull H((O)) that has a pro-
hibitively large constraint set and does not admit an ecient
separation oracle we still have one tool at our disposal: we
can modify H((O)) to get an alternate price space  which
we can work with eciently. Recall that in Section 3, we
arrived at the requirement that  = H((O)) as a necessary
conclusion of the proposed conditions on our market maker.
If we wish to violate this requirement, we need to consider
which conditions must be weakened and revise the resulting
guarantees from Section 3.
We will continue to construct our markets in the usual
way, via the tuple (O;;;R) where O is the outcome space,
 is the payo function,   R
d is a convex compact set of
feasible prices, and R : R
d ! R is a strictly convex function
with domain . The market's cost function C will be the
conjugate of R with respect to the set , as in Equation 1.
The only dierence is that we now allow  to be distinct
from H((O)). Not surprisingly, the choice of  will aect
the interest of the traders and the market maker. We prove
several claims which will aid us in our market design. The-
orem 5 tells us that the expressiveness condition should not
be relaxed, while Theorem 6 tells us that the no-arbitrage
condition can be. Together, these imply that we may safely
choose  to be a superset of H((O)).
Theorem 5. For any complex cost function based mar-
ket, the worst-case loss of the market maker is unbounded if
(O) * .
This (perhaps surprising) theorem tells us that expres-
siveness is not only useful for information aggregation, it is
actually necessary for the market maker to avoid unbounded
loss. The proof involves showing that if o is the nal out-
come and (o) 62 , then it is possible to make an innite
sequence of trades such that each trade causes a constant
amount of loss to the market maker.
In the following theorem, which is a simple extension of
Theorem 3, we see that including additional price vectors
in  does not adversely impact the market maker's worst-
case loss, despite the fact that the no-arbitrage condition is
violated.
Theorem 6. Consider any complex cost function based
market with R and  satisfying supx2H((O)) R(x) < 1 and
10More precisely, a separation oracle returns any separating
hyperplane that divides the input from the feasible set.H((O))  . Assume that the initial price vector satises
rC(0) 2 H((O)). Let q denote the vector of quantities
sold and o denote the true outcome. The monetary loss of
the market maker is no more than
R((o))   min
x2H((O))
R(x)   DR((o);rC(q)):
This tells us that expanding  can only help the market
maker; increasing the range of rC(q) can only increase the
divergence term. This may seem somewhat counterintuitive.
We originally required that   H((O)) as a consequence
of the no-arbitrage condition, and by relaxing this condition,
we are providing traders with potential arbitrage opportu-
nities. However, these arbitrage opportunities do not hurt
the market maker. As long as the initial price vector lies
in H((O)), any such situations where a trader can earn a
guaranteed prot are eectively created (and paid for) by
other traders! In fact, if the nal price vector rC(q) falls
outside the convex hull, the divergence term will be strictly
positive, improving the bound.
To elaborate on this point, let's consider an example where
 is strictly larger than H((O)). Let q be the current
vector of purchases, and assume the associated price vector
x = rC(q) lies in the interior of H((O)). Consider a
trader who purchases a bundle r such that the new price
vector leaves this set, i.e., y := rC(q + r) = 2 H((O)). We
claim that this choice can be strictly improved in the sense
that there is an alternative bundle r
0 whose associated prot,
for any outcome o, is strictly greater than the prot for r.
For simplicity, assume y is an interior point of  n
H((O)) so that q + r = rR(y). Dene (y) :=
argminy02H((O)) DR(y
0;y), the minimum divergence pro-
jection of y into H((O)). The alternative bundle we con-
sider is r
0 = rR((y))   q. Our trader pays C(q + r)  
C(q + r
0) less to purchase r
0 than to purchase r. Hence, for
any outcome o, we see that the increased prot for r
0 over r
is
(o)  (r
0   r)   C(q + r
0) + C(q + r)
> (o)  (r
0   r) + rC(q + r
0)  (r   r
0)
= ((o)   (y))  (r
0   r): (3)
Notice that we achieve strict inequality precisely because
rC(q + r
0) 6= rC(q + r). Now use the optimality
condition for (y) to see that, since (o) 2 H((O)),
r(y)(DR((y);y))  ((o)   (y))  0. It is easy to check
that r(y)(DR((y);y)) = rR((y))   rR(y) = r
0   r.
Combining this last expression with the inequality above
and (3) tells us that the prot increase is strictly greater
than ((o)   (y))  (r
0   r)  0. Simply put, the trader
receives a guaranteed positive increase in prot for any out-
come o.
The next theorem shows that any time the price vector
lies outside of (o), traders could prot by moving it back
inside. The proof uses a nice application of minimax duality
for convex-concave functions.
Theorem 7. For any complex cost function based mar-
ket, given a current quantity vector q0 with current price
vector rC(q0) = x0, a trader has the opportunity to earn a
guaranteed prot of at least minx2H((O)) DR(x;x0).
When x0 2 H((O)), DR(x;x0) is minimized when x = x0
and the bound is vacuous, as we would expect. The more
interesting case occurs when the prices have fallen outside
of H((O)), in which case a trader is guaranteed a riskless
prot by moving rC(q) to the closest point in H((O)).
5.3 Pair Betting via Relaxation
We return our attention to the scenario where the outcome
is a ranking of n competitors, as described in Section 4.1.
Consider a complex market in which traders make arbitrary
pair bets: for every i;j, a trader can purchase a security
which pays out $1 whenever (i) > (j). Like subset bets,
pricing pair bets using LMSR is known to be #P-hard [12].
We can represent the payo structure of any such outcome
 by a matrix M dened by
M(i;j) =
8
> <
> :
1; if (i) > (j)
1
2; if i = j
0; if (i) < (j):
We would like to choose our feasible price region as the set
H(fM :  2 Sng), where Sn is the set of permutations on
[n]. Unfortunately, the computation of this convex hull is
necessarily hard: if given only a separation oracle for the
set H(fM :  2 Sng), we could construct a linear program
to solve the \minimum feedback arc set" problem, which is
known to be NP-hard.
On the positive side, we see from the previous section that
the market maker can work in a larger feasible price space
without risking a larger loss. We thus relax our feasible price
region  to the set of matrices X 2 R
n2
satisfying
X(i;j)  0 8i;j 2 [n]
X(i;j) = 1   X(j;i) 8i;j 2 [n]
X(i;j) + X(j;k) + X(k;i)  1 8i;j;k 2 [n]
This relaxation was rst discussed by Meggido [26], who
referred to such matrices as generalized order matrices. He
proved that, for n  4, we do have  = H(fM :  2 Sng),
but gave a counterexample showing strict containment for
n = 13. By using this relaxed price space, the market maker
allows traders to bring the price vector outside of the convex
hull, yet includes a set of basic (and natural) constraints on
the prices. Such a market could be implemented with any
strongly convex conjugate function (e.g., quadratic).
6. CONCLUSION
We conclude by mentioning one nice direction of work.
As we discussed, there is an inherent tradeo between the
bid-ask spread and the worst-case loss of the market maker.
But if the market maker chooses to sell securities with an
additional transaction cost for each security sold, then this
money can not only help to cover the worst-case loss, but
can also lead to a prot. Furthermore, if a market becomes
popular, the market-maker may wish to increase the market
depth. This idea has been explored by Othman et al. [28] for
the case of complete markets, introducing a liquidity sensi-
tive market maker, and they provide a new model with prot
guarantees. Othman and Sandholm [27] recently extend the
work and characterize a family of market makers that are
liquidity sensitive. Via our framework, we can dene an al-
ternative method for simultaneously including transaction
costs and guaranteeing prot. In particular, this is achieved
through relaxing the price space, as discussed in Section 5.2.
We leave the details to future work.7. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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